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ABSTRACT 
Social security is a complex instrument of transfer payments in 
France, consisting of numerous regimes covering different groups of the 
population. Benefits are extensive and may be classified into three 
categories: medical, old-age, and family. The system represents a 
large and increasing part of the national economy and is financed 
largely through employer and employee contributions. 
French demography is characterized by slow decreases in mortality at 
most ages and by a decreasing fertility. Fecundity rates have fallen 
below the 2.1 level necessary for the replacement of generations. 
Population projections through 2075 are presented, given various fecun-
dity hypotheses, both constant and fluctuating. 
Financially, French social security since 1968 has been marked by 
instability. During the 1970's, certain funds (family benefits, for 
example) were often in a surplus state, while others (medical benefits) 
often ran a deficit. This instability was due to numerous factors: 
demography, political changes in benefits and contributions, and economic 
recession. The demographic factor in the future will favor continued 
deficits in the medical and old-age branches which will be only partially 
offset by surpluses in the family branch. 
Social security, as a kind of collective intergenerational transfer, 
is concerned with the ratio of inactives to actives in the population. 
While actives as a percent of the total population are fairly constant 
even with a, changing fecundity, movements between the groups of young and 
aged persons can be significant. The cost to the nation of a retiree 
is only slightly more than that of a young person, so from this perspec-
tive, fertility change is not so important. From the perspective of 
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government though, the change is more important, as government spends 
2.50 times as much on individual retirees as on children. In any case 
the effects of fertility change are seen to be less than the potential 
effects of a change in the retirement age or an increase in feminine 
activity in the workforce. 
The life of a pay-as-you-go pension scheme involves three groups: 
the initial generations, the intervening generations, and the terminal 
generations. These first receive benefits without having contributed 
to the system; the second receive benefits which reflect, ideally, 
contributions made plus increases for demographic and economic growth; 
and the third contribute without receiving any benefits. 
A capitalized pension system would establish a fund where contri-
butions would collect interest. Under stable conditions, the individual 
contributions in a funded system or a pay-as-you-go system would be 
equal whenever the natural growth rate of the population equaled the 
interest rate adjusted for inflation. A fully-capitalized system on a 
national level, however, would probably be impossible due to the capital 
demands of the fund. A partially-funded scheme, such as exists in 
Sweden, might be possible, however. 
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Introduction 
The material survival of any society depends on the work of its 
active population. These are the people engaged in the production of 
the goods and services which maintain the standard of living for the 
entire society. These goods and services will be consumed not only by 
the active group which produces them, but also by the inactive, 
dependent sector which is, for one reason or another, not engaged in 
productive work. 
This dependent sector is composed of four groups according to the 
nature of their inactivity: the "idle by choice," the temporarily or 
permanently handicapped, the aged, and the young. Our interest in 
this paper will be the last two of these groups. It will be necessary 
to note that often there is a certain debatable overlap between the old 
or the young with the "idle by choice"--for examp~e, the retiree who 
would be perfectly capable of further work, or the adolescent who could 
very well leave school and begin contributing to society in a more 
direct way--and we will make little attempt to answer where the line 
ought to be drawn. Rather, society's general definition of what constitutes 
a young person or a retiree will be accepted, and an attempt will be made 
to examine in an objective manner the intergenerational transfer of 
resources made from the active population to these two dependent groups. 
The examination will concentrate on the public institutions, 
especially social security, which in our day effect this transfer, 
the financial pressures undergone by these systems as a result of 
demographic shifts between the active and inactive groups, and finally, 
the feasibility of adjustments or alterations in the mechanism of the 
financial transfer. The majority of the examples and illustrations will 
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~ be drawn from France, whose social security system is noted for the 
strength of its benefits for both groups of the inactive population 
under consideration (that is, for both the young and the old). 
-
As mentioned earlier, there is some question as to the point at 
which childxen cease to qualify as inactive by the fact that they are 
young and must rather be classified as "idle by choice." If there is, 
however, no dispute concerning the fact that in today's society there 
are some who extend their education to a non-productive level, there 
is also little disagreement over the need of children, at some very 
young age, for the care and support of the older generation. For our 
purposes, then, the choice of at what age a child ought to start 
fending for himself is irrelevant. What is important is that all 
children are dependent for a certain period of time and that this care 
must come in one way or another from the active population. 
In an earlier day, this care would have come almost exclusively from 
the immediate family. The child was almost inevitably clothed, fed, and 
educated in the home up until the time he could establish complete 
independence. The movement through recent centuries, though, has been 
away from familial responsibility in the rearing of children and toward 
an ever-increasing societal role. The lessening family role did not 
begin, however, with television, microwave ovens, and working mothers 
in the 1970's; it is rather largely the result of community education, 
a trend which began centuries ago in the form of parochial schools and 
which manifests itself in the public schools so common in the industrial-
ized countries of today, including France. In the measure that these 
schools represent a major expenditure for the rearing of the nation's 
youth, a significant part of the intergenerational transfer from the 
active population to the young has passed from the home and the church 
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into the hands of the government. 
In this sense the transfer is more and more one of a block 
transfer from one group to another whereby the individual relationship 
within a family is losing out in favor of a collective relationship 
between the active population and various dependent groups. Without 
assessing the effects that this shift has undoubtedly had on interpersonal 
relationships in our society or on any resulting economic and cultural 
growth, we shall note nonetheless that this transfer is one which is 
accepted almost without question in our day. Community education 
(usually public, but also parochial) has taken its place as a seemingly 
permanent means of publicly administered intergenerational transfer. 
Other means of transfer, at least from an American point of view, 
may not seem so permanent, and even if social security is more of an 
untouchable in France than in the U. S., it is certainly still more 
touchable in principle than publicly funded education. Intergenerational 
transfers to the young through social security are among the highest 
in the world in France and will be detailed at a later point in this 
paper. These "family benefits" reflect not only a governmental attempt 
to influence the birthrate, but also a genuine desire to help families 
wi th the financial burdens of raising children. To this extent, they 
represent a transfer effected between two sectors of the active population 
--from those without children to those with--as well as an intergenera-
tional transfer from the active group to the young. In the sense, 
however, that they have altered the nature of the dependency relationship 
through which parents support their children, we shall consider them as 
intergenerational transfers. 
Like the question of when a child should start work, there exists 
a question as to when an aged person should stop. As in the case of a 
--
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very young child, however, for all those who avoid a sudden death there 
is a period of inactivity at the end of life which must, of necessity, 
be supported by the active population. In addition, there is no doubt 
that there are, in the industrial societies of today such as France, 
a large number of retirees who depend at least partially on the support 
of the active population even though they could in theory continue 
productive work. We shall make no attempt to distinguish between these 
two groups, accepting instead society's standard of fairness in allowing 
all those above a certain age (even if this age is poorly defined) 
a period of inactivity before death. 
For those within this group who are truly inactive (in an economic 
sense) survival is dependent on personal savings, private contributions, 
or public assistance and social security. Obviously, that part of their 
survival which is based on personal savings from the active period of 
life is by no means an intergenerational transfer. Also, to the extent 
that social security might be based on capitalized reserve funds, the 
retirement benefits received through this system would not represent 
such a transfer; but as the old-age social security systems of most 
countries, including France, are financed almost entirely by a redistri-
bution of wealth from the active to the retired populations (the pay-as-
you-go system of financing), public pensions, like public assistance 
and private contributions, represent a significant intergenerational 
transfer. Furthermore, the growth of social insurance for the aged 
in this century marks a change in the nature of this transfer. In days 
gone by, the only means of support for an invalid retiree was private 
charity (usually religiously affiliated) or family and friends. Today, 
as the support becomes more and more public, it becomes a question of 
block transfers of funds from the active population to the old. 
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In all cases, then, we must concern ourselves with the dependency 
relationship between whole groups of the population. If this dependency 
relied, as it used to, on the relationships within individual families 
or small groups between the economically productive and the young or 
aged, our study would be on the changes within that relationship as 
the proportions of young, old, and actives changed. Our point of view, 
though, is the demographic movement between these large groups and the 
effect that this movement will have on social systems established to 
regulate the transfer of funds. If in any way the prognosis is 
pessimistic, that will not mean that the newer system is to blame, for 
surely indi.vidual families would have undergone similar strains in 
dealing on an individual basis with the same problems. Indeed, it is 
for this reason that public institutions have been established. 
To the extent that the public solution may aggravate the problem 
of dependence, though--through unnecessarily prolonged education or through 
premature retirement--an alternative solution may be in order. For this 
reason, we shall consider the funding mechanism of old-age pensions under 
social security in detail, examining the theoretical possibility of a 
funded or capitalized system. In this wayan entire generation would be 
forced to save for its retirement and would thus be less dependent in 
old age. Also to be explored are the effects of changing the retirement 
age under social security. Although the movement has been toward 
raising this age in the U.S., France has moved in the opposite direction. 
It will first be necessary, then, to consider the social security 
system as it exists in France today, along with a brief look at its 
history which should help to explain the present nature of the benefits 
offered and the contributions required. A certain background on the 
French demographic situation will be needed also before embarking upon 
the financial pressures undergone by the social security system, 
especially since 1968. Finally, we shall arrive upon a consideration 
of the theoretical possibilities for social security financing with 
a comparison of the capitalized (or funded) and pay-as-you-go (or 
redistribution) systems. 
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The French Social Security System 
The idea of social security as a social institution was born in 
Bismarck's Germany in the late nineteenth century. The goal was to 
provide a certain level of protection against various social risks--
illness, old-age, family, unemployment, etc. Benefit formulas were 
established in the 1880's but were limited to salaried workers. It was 
not until the Second World War in Great Britain, however, that social 
security came to be considered a vehicle for the redistribution of 
income among social classes and was applied to all workers, salaried 
or not. 1 
The present social security system in France dates from after 
World War II. Various programs covering certain groups within the 
population had been in effect since the 1930's, but it was after the 
war that a comprehensive program was established to provide income 
security for the entire working population and its dependents. If 
security from life's unforeseeable events was the general goal of the 
program, there existed also several secondary objectives for which the 
system would be responsible. For our purposes, these other factors 
are important for their influence on the benefits offered today. As we 
shall see, certain areas were heavily emphasized at the birth of this 
system, and certain irregularities established, which affect to this day 
the slant of the benefits and make the French system uni~ue. 
The characteristics of the system result from three factors which 
were peculiar to France after the war: 
(1) Decline in the birthrate. This was a trend established at 
the beginning of the century. It was particularly marked 
during the period from 1919 to 1939. In 1938 and 1939, the 
birth rate was about 14 per 1000, lower even than the death 
--
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ra.te. Thus, the post-war social security program reflected 
a general concern for this fertility crisis in the emphasis 
it gave to the child bearing and family aspects of the program. 
The strongest family benefits package in the world was the 
result. 
(2) Existence of numerous older laws. It would not, of course, 
have been possible to build a social security system from 
scratch in a country which already had a history of social 
legislation in this area. It was thus necessary to incorporate 
into the system such diverse elements as: 
--a social insurance law from 1930 to cover low income workers 
against sickness, maternity, disability, old age, and death; 
--a law on family allowances; 
--a complete insurance plan for workers in certain categories, 
including, for example, merchant seamen, miners, railway 
personnel, and civil servants. 
The importance of these influences is that they created 
certain irregularities in a system established with a stated 
goal of equality and regularity among all groups concerned. 
(3) Influence of democratic traditions. This concerns chiefly 
the administration of the system and the French tradition 
of an individual's control in the institutions established 
for his benefit. 2 
For our purposes, these first two factors are of great importance: 
the first, because family benefits represent a significant portion 
even today of social security outlays and must hence be weighed in 
any long-term financial analysis against the costs of, for example, 
Old-age pensions; the second, because the administrative irregularities 
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(for example, the large array of special regimes) require individual 
analyses as concerns the financial health and stability of the system. 
Integration of individual programs into a unified whole, although it 
becomes more and more necessary, appears no more probable today than 
ever. As Laroque points out, "the rugged individualism of social 
and economic groups is very powerful in France, and here it won out 
over the principle of national solidarity that was one of the fundamental 
bases of the plan of 1945.,,3 
The original stated goals of the French social security system to 
which Laroque refers were those of (1) the generalization of the system 
to cover the entire population, (2) the overall unity of the system as 
concerns contributions and benefits, and (3) the social solidarity to be 
achieved through the existence of the system. It can be said that the 
first of these goals, that of generalization, has been largely achieved. 
In 1945, only 53% of the entire population was covered by health 
insurance, for example, compared to 98% since 1968.4 
It is chiefly in terms of the unity of the system that the original 
goals have not been realized. To the contrary, a look at the complexity 
of the various regimes shows that the system is far from having a 
unified character. In addition to the "r~gime g~n~ral" which covers 
more than 65% of all workers, there are numerous special regimes for 
both salaried and non-salaried workers. These "~gimes sp~ciaux" cover 
such salaried groups as miners, railway workers, public transport workers, 
utility employees, civil bureaucrats, merchant marines, notary clerks, 
and salaried agricultural workers; and such non-salaried groups as 
artisans and small businessmen, various professional groups, farmers, 
and voluntary insureds. 
This complexity of organization would have fewer consequences, were 
--
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it not accompanied by inequalities of coverage which seem scarcely 
justified. Traditionally, the special regimes have provided their 
members with benefits which were both more generous and more extensive. 
These continued inequities are heavily criticized by Laroque5: 
If these inequalities were the consequence of the varying 
amount of effort on the part of one group or another to build 
up reserves, and if the pensions were a reward for accumulated 
savings, they might have some foundation. But all systems, 
legal or contractual, generally exclude any capitalization. 
Their function is purely that of distribution. That is to say, 
it is actually the economy of the country, the consumers, 
who support en bloc the burden of all pensions, and the inequality 
thereby seems all the more shocking. Here again the evolution 
of the system has run counter to a healthy conception of national 
solidari ty. 
Three solutions for rectifying this lack of unity have been 
suggested: 
or 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
the regrouping of all regimes into one for the entire population; 
the unification of all regimes of salaried workers; 
the unification of contributions and benefits in all regimes 
through progressive increases, with deteriorating regimes 
supported by direct state aid or transfers from other regimes. 6 
The national solidarity sought through the establishment of a 
large-scale social security system has been hampered by persistant 
irregularities among the various regimes. For instance, according to a 
Paris Chamber of Commerce study, the return on contributions received by 
various groups suffers from astonishing inequalities: 1.57% for state 
personnel, 2.05% for those in liberal professions, 2.09% for miners, 
and 16.75% for farmers. 7 
The social security system has nevertheless promoted a certain 
level of solidarity within the country, both within and among the various 
social groups. The special regimes have encouraged a professional 
solidarity; the general regime has shown, in supporting financially 
--
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weak regimes, an interprofessional solidarity; and the national 
solidarity has been established through the use of taxes for the support 
of non-contributory benefits. In short, social security in France 
has become a very significant economic factor, both on the individual 
as well as national levels, and has thus, in spite of its irregularities, 
provided a strong unifying force within the country. 
The growth of social security outlays in France, expressed as a 
percent of the national income, has been continual. The total benefits 
provided by· the early social security systems in 1938 represented only 
5% of the t.otal national income. For 1983, total expenses were 
expected to represent 26.4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).8 
These expenses also account for 80% of the total "social effort" of 
the nation and are of a magnitude approximately equal to that of the 
national budget (which is separate from social security). In Table I 
we can see the continued growth of social security expenses which 
outpace from year to year the growth in the GOP. In this way social 
security in France continues to assume an ever-greater importance in the 
economy. Also to be noted at this point for future reference is the 
relative importance of employer contributions beside those provided 
by the employees. 
These vast sums fall under the jurisdiction of various branches 
of the total scheme. By far the largest of these is the "regime 
general," which accounts for 6570 of all contributing workers. This 
general regime covers all salaried workers who are not covered by one 
of the many special regimes. These "regimes speciaux" regroup some 
15% of the French population, but because of the superior benefits 
offered, they account for 25% of all benefits. 9 Some of these are 
remnants of systems in existence long before World War II (those for 
---
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TABLE I: Principal Macroeconomic Data Concerning French Social Security 
(all totals are in billions of francs, proportions and increases 
are in %, data estimated for 1982 and 1983) 
Total S.S. Outlays 
(% increase) 
GDP 
S.S./GDP (%) 
!2Z2. 
508 
2135 
23.8 
Total Social Effort 6}4 
S.S./T.S.E. (%) 80.1 
Total Benefits 468 
Benefits/S.S. (%) 92.1 
Total Contributions 
of which: 
Employer (%) 
Employee (%) 
4-56 
7).5 
27.2 
15.0 
24-07 
24-.25 
748 
78.1 
540 
92.5 
535 
71.4-
28.8 
1981 
684 
17.1 
2688 
25.4-5 
896 
76.3 
635 
92.8 
602 
72.3 
27.7 
1982 
801 
17.1 
3064-
26.15 
704-
71.4-
28.6 
198) 
897 
12.0 
}404-
26.4-
776 
71.3 
28.7 
Source: Mlnistere des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidari te Nationale. 
Commission des Comptes de la Securite Sociale. Rapport presente ~ la 
session du 20 decembre 1982. 
miners, sajlors, railroad workers, etc.), while others are more recent 
creations (those for utility and public transport workers, for instance). 
The "regimes complementaires" were created to complement the 
pensions offered by the other systems. All salaried workers are 
covered under one of two programs, one for managerial and the other 
for non-mar~gerial employees. Because certain independent workers 
desired to maintain their autonomy as concerns social security, the 
"regimes autonomes" were established for such groups as artisans and 
members of the liberal professions. 
The 684 billion francs spent by these various regimes in 1981 
represent expenditures in five categories, as illustrated in Graph I: 
--, 
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(1) 45.4% of all expenditures went for coverage of the risks of 
"disabili ty, old age, and survivorship." The largest parti-
cipants in these pensions were, respectively, the general 
regime, the special regime covering government employees, 
the complementary regime covering non-managerial workers, 
and the system covering agricultural workers. These four 
groups represented two-thirds of pension expenses. 
(2) 29.3% covered the medical risks, of which the general regime 
accounted for three-fourths. 
(3) 13% consisted of the family benefits. Three-fourths of these 
were covered by the general regime. 
(4) 3.8% went for workmenrs compensation. Again the general 
regime assumed three-fourths of all expenditures. 
(5) 6.4% represented the administrative costs involved with the 
t (}. 6%) "al d "t t" "t" t 10 sys em ~. 0 ,soc~ an s~ ary ac ~v~ ~es, e c. 
Within the general regime these expenditures are administered by 
three large branches controlling benefits and contributions for old-age, 
medical, and family risks. This organization dates from the reforms 
of 1967. At the top of each branch is a national fund which receives 
all contrirnltions and from which are paid all benefits. Transfers 
between the funds have become common in times of need (as have transfers 
from one regime to another). We shall discuss the nature of these 
transfers at length later on, but for now we turn to the financing 
mechanism wIuch these funds represent, examin~ng £irst-the means-of 
collecting contributions and second the benefits provided. 
The largest part of the funding for these three branches comes 
from employer and employee contributions. In all cases the required 
contribution is some percent of salary, usually limited by a salary 
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GRAPH I: Breakdown of Total French Social Security Expenditures--1981 
Family 
Health and 
Sickness 
Diverse 
13% 
Hospitalization 
14% 
/ Other 
/ Medical 
I 15.3% 
Source: Ministere des Affaires Sociales. Rapport, 1982. 
Old Age, 
Disability, 
Survivors 
cap. In 1980 this cap was fixed at 60,120 francs per year. The contri-
butions by fund are as follows: 
(1) Medical Fund 
-for employers: 8.95% within the limit of the salary cap, 
plus 4.5% of the total salary, plus the workmen's compensation 
contribution which ranges from 0.5-25% (the average is around 
4%) wi thin the salary cap limit; 
-for employees: 5.5% of the total salary; 
(2) Old-age Fund 
-for employers: 8.20% within the limit of the salary cap; 
-for employees: 4.70% wi thin the limit of the salary cap; 
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(3) Fcunily Fund 
-for employers: 9.1% within the limit of the salary cap. 
If we then retain the 4.0% average for the workmen's compensation 
contribution, we may summarize total contributions as follows: 
-for employers: 30.25% within the limit of the salary cap, 
plus 4.5% of the total salary; 
-for employees: 4.70% within the salary cap limit, plus 5.5% 
11 
of the total salary. 
These employer-employee contributions account for a relatively 
large part of social security expenditures in France. As we can easily 
calculate from the data in Table I, total contributions in 1981 
repres ent eo. 88% of all social security outlays. This fact places 
France in a unique position among the countries of western Europe, 
for it is in France that one finds the lowest degree of direct govern-
mental financing of social security and the highest degree of employer 
participation. For instance, in contrast to the 11~12% f~nancial 
participation of the French government, governments subsidize around 
8.5% in Denn:ark, 38% in the United Kingdom, 20. '7% in the German Federal 
Republic, and 23.4% in Italy, of the total social security cost. 
Inversely, employer contributions in these countries are significantly 
weaker. 12 
The benefits offered under the system are generous by American 
standards. The Medical Fund (with which we are the least concerned) 
assumes almost all costs incurred through hospitalization, medical 
visits, and pharmaceutical services. Family benefits consist of 
various "allocations" depending on particular family circumstances. 
In 1974, 61% of all outlays within this branch were for the general 
"family allocations" which provide an allowance to all families with 
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two or more children. Also significant are the single-breadwinner 
allocation and the housing allocation which accounted for 18% and 14.3%, 
respectively. Other benefits include the pre-natal allocation, the 
maternity allocation, and other various benefits. 13 
Far more complicated are the benefits paid by the Old-age Fund, 
especially if a comparison is made between the general regime and the 
plethora of other regimes providing old-age pensions. (As we saw earlier, 
the general regime assumes a more complete role in terms of total family 
and medical benefits paid out than in the area of old-age pensions.) 
Before the reforms of 1982, pensions were payable by the general regime 
beginning at age 60, with 37.5 years of covered earnings needed for a 
"full" pension. These 37.5 years were divided into 150 quarterly 
periods, so that each missing period resulted in a reduction of 1/150 
of the possible pension. Working women who had also raised children 
could count. an extra two years of covered earnings for each child. 
At the time retirement was taken, the pension was calculated 
based on an individual's 10 highest years of income, which were revalued 
to reflect current wage levels. At age 60 a "full" pension was 25% of 
the average 10-year earnings, and this percentage increased 5% for each 
year of deferred retirement. Therefore, at age 65 the benefit amounted 
to 50% of the average covered earnings; and at age 70, 75%. Since the 
average pension at age 60 was thus so low compared to the one received 
upon waiting five additional years, age 65 remained the "normal" 
t · t 14 re ~remen age. 
Dissatisfaction with a normal retirement age of 60 fostered some 
preliminary reforms during the 1970's. Much attention had been drawn 
to the subject, in part because various favored groups already 
benefited from retirement plans under social security as early as age 
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55. These groups were generally those covered by one 'of ·the speaial 
regimes, i:'lcluding agricultural workers, seamen, miners, primary 
school teachers, government employees, and the self-employed. 
In 1975, benefit levels at age 60 were raised modestly, but the 
increases ~ere inadequate to make early retirement a much more common 
choice. In response to high unemployment, the government made moves 
in 1976 to encourage early retirement within certain "underprivileged" 
groups, such as manual workers with 42 years of contributions and women 
who had raised children and engaged in blue-collar work. These groups 
were offered full pensions at age 60. Early retirement provisions also 
existed for the unemployed. 15 
Exteru,ion of these early benefits to the entire population came 
with the reforms of 1982. Those with 37t years of contributions can 
now retire at age 60 with a pension equal to 50% of the best ten years' 
earnings. For retirement between ages 60 and 65, if the retiree lacks 
a full 37t years of contributions, the 50% rate is reduced by whichever 
of the following is more favorable for the employee: 
-1.25% per quarter less than 150 quarters; 
or -1.25~~ per quarter less than age 65. 
If a worker at age 65 still has not completed 150 quarters of contri-
butions, calculation is based on the actual quarters credited, and the 
result is then increased by 2.5% per quarter of deferral of retirement 
after age 65. However, the increase cannot result in the pension being 
more than 50% of the base pay.16 
This, then, provides a brief description of how the social security 
system functions in France. Next, we shall consider the French demo-
graphic si t.uation before examining the interactions between demography, 
social security,' and intergenerational transfers. 
--
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The French Demographic Situation with Projections for the Future 
The present demographic situation in France is the result of 
several interrelated factors. In addition to a generally improving 
mortality rate and a fluctuating birth rate, there are historical 
influences such as the two world wars which make their presence felt 
in the age pyramid as shown below. The circled numbers mark numerically 
depressed cohorts, with the explanations for these phenomena as follows: 
(1) lives lost in World War I, 1914-1918; 
(2) reduced births during World War I; 
(3) World War I babies at child-bearing age; 
(4) reduced births during World War II, 1939-1945; 
and (5) low birth rate of recent years. 
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Of co-·.rrse, events such as wars are not foreseeable within demo-
graphic predictions. Aside from these factors, though, there are the 
influences of mortality, fertility, and migration which have a signifi-
cant influence on the demographic evolution of a country. We shall 
examine the historic evolution of these factors (especially mortality 
and fertility) and shall then consider the forecasts which have been 
made for the French population over the next century. 
Mortality in France has in general shown steady improvement over 
the past century. In Table II we can see these advances at various 
ages in terms of the life expectancy. It should be noted that it is 
for the 10'l-rer ages that the greatest improvements have been made. 
Also the superior improvements in female mortality become especially 
apparent at the higher ages. 
There are four important factors in the evolution of the French 
mortali ty by age group: 
(1) infant mortality has diminished in a continual manner which 
has affected e~ually both sexes; 
(2) at all other ages, female mortality has pulled back significantly 
more than the male mortality, and this is particularly true 
for young adults (ages 20-40) and the aged (over 60); 
(3) the slowdown in mortality improvements was experienced by 
both sexes but was accompanied, for males, by a recrudescence 
of mortality at age 20 as well as at ages 40-50; 
(4) during the 1970's the growth in teenage mortality was amplified 
and affected females for the first time, whereas at almost all 
other ages, important advances were again recorded. 17 
Disturbing from a social point of view are the increases in 
mortality among teenagers and middle-aged men, for these reflect a 
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TABLE II: Evolution of French Life Expectancy at Various Ages 
Ages: 0 1 5 20 60 65 80 
Male 
1898-1903 45.31 53.10 53.08 37.52 13.31 10.46 4.37 
1928-1933 54.30 58.63 56.47 39.40 13.76 10.86 4.44 
1950-1951 63.6 66.1 62.7 43.8 15.1 11.9 4.8 
1973-1977 69.10 69.17 65.38 50.98 16.61 13.32 5.90 
Female 
1898-1903 48.69 55.34 55.26 40.01 14.58 11.47 4.89 
1928-1933 59.02 62.53 60.32 43.52 15.94 12.57 5.09 
1950-1951 69.3 71.2 67.8 48.7 18.1 14.4 5.9 
1973-1977 77.00 76.91 73.09 58.44 21.44 17.34 7.33 
Sources: VallitL, Jacques. "Tendances recentes de la mortali te 
francaise." Population, no. 1, 1983. 
Netter, Francis. "Reflexions suggerees par l'experience 
francaise." From the Atti della II Conferenza internazionale degli 
Attuari ~ Statistici della Sicurezza Sociale, Rome, October 1959. 
growth in lmnatural causes of death, especially automobile accidents. 
More interesting from a demographic point of view, however, is the 
evolution of the infant mortality. During the first part of this 
century, up to World War II, infant mortality fell from 165 to 70 per 
1000 births, or a decrease of around 2% per year. After the war, the 
rate of improvement accelerated, attaining a near-constant 6% per year. 
It was thus that the rate fell from 78 per 1000 births in 1946 to 10 per 
1000 in 19'79. What is important is that this rate of increase has 
continued even at the very low levels now being experienced. Thus, 
infant mort-ali ty from 1975 to 1979 dropped from 13.7 to 10.0 per 1000, 
which represents a continued 6% decrease. 18 
The strength of this decrease in infant mortality explains to a 
very large degree the increase in the life expectancy at birth as seen 
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in Table II. Also important has been the virtual disappearance of 
infectious diseases in later childhood and young adulthood. This is 
important for our purposes because we are interested in how this decrease 
in mortality has affected the population structure and thus the depen-
dency relationship between the active and the inactive populations. 
As Keyfitz points out, however, mortality improvements have little net 
effect on the dependency ratio (inactives/actives). Although retired 
people live longer (and thus draw more social security benefits), and 
although there are more children to be educated, there is the strong 
counterbalancing effect of the increase in the active population since 
more and more people survive infancy and childhood. 19 
What really affects the retired to active ratio, according to 
Keyfi tz, are the fertility and fecundity changes of a country. If 
fertility is defined as the number of births per year for a group of 
1000 women, fecundity may be thought of as the average number of children 
born to a uoman during her productive lifetime. These fecundity rates 
may express the average number of births for a particular group of women 
(for instrulce, all those born in the same year within a given country), 
or for all the women of child-bearing age within a country at a 
particular time. To insure the continuation of the population at 
its present level (all other factors held constant), each woman must 
produce, on the average, 2.1 children. This is, inceffect,two'.d'lildren 
to replace the parents plus an extra one-tenth of a child (on the average, 
of course!) to account for those children who die before reaching 
reproductive age. 
The fecundity rate, then, expresses an average number of descen-
dants left by each woman before the end of her reproductive life. If we 
consider the rate by generations in France, we note that for the 
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decennial groups of women born from 1890 to 1940, the fecundity rate 
was situated above two children per woman even for the generations 
affected by the two world wars. Starting with the generation born in 
1950, though, the tendency was toward fewer than two children per woman, 
a tendency which will, if it continues, have the effect of reducing in 
a real sense the total population of the country.20 Most recently, the 
rate of fec:undity for all women of productive age, as measured in 1983, 
was a feeble 1.8. 21 The causes of this decline are cultural as well as 
technological. The growth of contraception in France has provided the 
means, while certain social factors such as working women and a changing 
concept of the "model family" have given the stimulus. 
Although those who fear such a drop in fecundity (and the corre-
spondingly lower fertility rates which must eventually follow) may find 
cause for a~arm, the situation does nevertheless possess the ability to 
reverse its.elf. Considering a composite fecundity rate by calendar years, 
we need only go back as far as 1973 to find the 2.1 rate necessary for 
the renewal. of generations. 22 In addition, according to certain 
economic theories, the less numerous generations of the future, when they 
enter the labor market with their reduced cohort and thus under less 
demanding competitive conditions, could be encouraged to increase their 
average family size. In any case, history speaks against the stability 
of fecundity rates. France in the 1940's appeared also to be aging 
to a certain extent and was taken by surprise when hit by the post-war 
baby boom. Additionally, since the beginning of this century, there 
is no developed country where fecundity has remained at the same level 
for fifteen or twenty years in a row. 23 
Several studies have been made of the French demographic situation, 
and forecasts are available for both the short and long terms. Two of 
--23-
the most e~densive sets of predictions made within the last few years 
are those developed by the "Institut National de la Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques" (INSEE--National Institute of Statistics and 
24 Economic Studies) in conjunction with the 1975 census ,and those 
published :m the national demographic journal, Population, by Le Bras 
and Tapinos, which emphasize the possible economic implications in the 
long term of these predictions. 25 Both studies rely on similar assump-
tions and, not surprisingly, arrive at similar results. For the reasons, 
however, that the latter is of more recent date, that it focuses on a 
long-term scenario, that it explores the possibility of a fluctuating 
fecundity rate, and that it emphasizes the economic-demographic inter-
play that interests us, we shall draw more heavily on its findings 
and analysis. 
As we have said, the most important variable in France's demographic 
evolution 1s the fecundity rate. In both the INSEE and the Le Bras-
Tapinos studies, the rates of 1.8 and 2.1 were chosen as likely values 
for the future evolution. The rate of 1.8 would assume, in effect, 
that the fecundity rate continues its movement downward, finally 
stabilizing at 1.8. (When the study was published, the fecundity rate 
was still slightly above the 1.8 which, as we noted, was recorded in 
1983.) An assumption of 2.1 supposes that the trend downward will be 
reversed over a period of years, and that the final "stable" rate will 
be around the level needed for exact replacement of the generations. 
Le Bras and Tapinos also considered two "erlreme" possibilities: 
final fecundity rates of 2.6 and 1.4. These are by no means unreason-
able, however, as they are, respectively, the rates of fecundity for 
French wome:a. born in 1930 and for West Germany of today. Also presented 
are the hypothetical results of an oscillation between these two erlreme 
.-
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values. 
It is instructive to examine briefly the assumptions implicit in 
each of these four models of fecundity. At the low end of the scale 
is the 1.4 hypothesis which represents a resistance to having a family. 
The average age at marriage is 25.5 years, even though 7.1% remain 
unmarried; and 15% of all couples immediately adopt contraceptive methods 
and will have no children. Among those who have a first child, only 
60% will rutve a second, and then the probability of continuation to each 
subsequent order is a mere 50%. 
The 1.8 hypothesis is, in fact, representative of the "two-child 
family." rl'hat is, the "model family" of two children is chosen by a 
majority of the couples. The average age at marriage is 22.5 years, 
with 8.5% lUllnarried, and only 5% of these couples rely immediately on 
contraception. After the first child, only 25% practice contraception 
to avoid a second one. After children of the second order and beyond, 
however, 60% of the couples turn to birth control. 
To achieve the model of a stationary population with a fecundity 
ra te of 2.1., the average age at marriage is 24 years, with 7% remaining 
unmarried. Immediately after marriage, no couples utilize birth control, 
and 75.10 of those who have a first child desire a second one without 
delay, while 4% of this group adopt contraception as a means of slowing 
the growth of their family. For all consecutive orders of children, 
40% of the couples seek to have an additional child without delay, 
while 20% u.tilize birth control for a period of time before trying for 
one more child. The final result of such a model again produces a 
dominance of two-child families, but also a greater number of higher-
order families, especially those of three children. 
An average fecundity rate of 2.6 represents a hesitation between 
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a family of 2 and a family of 3 children. The average age at marriage 
is 24 with an unmarried rate of 9%. All couples desire a first child, 
and then 9
'
'J% of those who produce a first attempt also to have a second. 
After the second child, 70% continue to the third order, and for all 
higher orders the proportion is only 50%. 
It is easy to notice, then, that only minor adjustments are needed 
in family attitudes toward children in order to arrive at fecundity 
hypotheses which vary from 1.4 to 2.6. This is somewhat remarkable 
when one realizes that such minor adjustments produce extremes which 
can lead either to a population explosion or extinction if maintained 
over a long enough period of time: 2.6 corresponds approximately to a 
0.7% rate of natural increase and thus a doubling of the population every 
100 years, whereas the 1.4 hypothesis produces an annual natural decrease 
of 1.5% and thus a reduction by half every 50 years. 
In the forecasts developed by Le Bras and Tapinos, these fecundity 
rates are phased in gradually over the period 1978-2000 and then held 
constant from 2000 to 2075. This stability over a 75-year period may 
seem ludicrous in light of the fluctuations experienced by developing 
nations over the past century, and, recognizing this, Le Bras and 
Tapinos offer four models of sustained fluctuations. In each of these, 
a decreasing fecundity is realized up until the year 2000 when the 
lowest level is achieved (1.4 children per woman), then a period of 
oscillation begins, lasting 25, 33, 50, or 100 years in which the 
fecundity increases to its highest level before starting back down again. 
These assurr.ptions are illustrated in Graph II. 
In general, it is possible to be more sure about the future 
evolution of mortality in a country than about the fecundity. It is 
for this reason that only one mortality hypothesis was retained in 
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GRAPH II: Three Oscillating Fecundity Hypotheses 
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both the INSEE and Le Bras-Tapinos studies. In the latter, the assump-
tions are based on the real evolution since 1946, extrapolated into the 
future. Trds does not result in very optimistic projections. Male 
life expectancy at birth is seen to level off at age 70: a weak 
improvement in the upper age groups is compensated by an increasing 
juvenile mortality. For women the forecast is slightly less pessi-
mistic: li.fe expectancy at birth should rise to 80 years and then 
level off in 2015. 
The effects of these assumptions on the total population of 
France are shown in Table III. Also shown are the composite birth and 
death rates and the resulting rate of natural increase. It is important 
to note tha.t until the year 2000, the choice of a fecundity assumption 
has little effect on the totals, which extend only from 53 to 60 
million. There are two reasons for this phenomenon: first, the fecundity 
rates are all subject to a period of phase-in where their differing 
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TABLE III: Evolution of the French Population following 4 Fecundity 
Hypotheses 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2025 2050 2075 
H1 52.74 53.33 53.67 53.71 53.52 53.11 46.90 35.30 25.01 
Total H2 52.74 53.41 54.08 54.68 55.17 55.42 53.50 47.03 40.57 
Population H3 52.74 53.45 54.38 55.42 56.48 57.38 59.86 59.66 59.79 
H4 52.74 53.54 54.87 55.60 58.54 60.37 70.54 83.38 101.08 
H1 14 13 13 12 11 10 8 8 8 
Birth H2 14 14 14 13 12 12 11 11 11 
Rate H3 14 14 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 
(per 1000) H4 14 15 17 18 18 17 18 18 18 
H1 11 11 12 12 12 12 15 21 21 
Death H2 11 11 12 12 12 12 14 17 17 
Rate H3 11 11 12 12 11 11 13 14 14 
(per 1000) H4 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Rate of H1 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -8 -13 -13 
Natural H2 3 3 2 2 1 0 -3 -6 -6 
Increase H3 3 3 3 3 4 3 0 0 0 
(per 1000) H4 3 4 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 
effects are less pronounced, and second, the people who are already born 
in 1975 re:present the greatest majority of the population even as late as 
the year 2000. In the period from 2000 to 2075, however, the differences 
are enlarged until the ratio of the largest to the smallest total popula-
tion is four to one: a population of 25 million recalls the size of the 
French population around 1750, while 100 million represents a doubling 
of the pop~lation in 100 years. Between these two extremes, the two 
intermediate totals fall in the vicinity of the present day population. 
It is instructive to notice the effect of inertia on population 
increase and decrease in this example. The phenomenon of inertia 
explains the increasing rate of separation between the four population 
totals. In the beginning years, even with a continually decreasing 
-
fecundity for the first hypothesis, the total continues to increase. 
In a similar manner, even if the fecundity rate were reversed at the 
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end of the 100-year period for this same hypothesis, the population 
would continue to decrease. Both of these facts are due to the underlying 
structure of the population, which influences not the fecundity of 
each individual woman, but rather ~he number of women of child-bearing 
age. In the France of today, a decreasing fecundity rate forebodes an 
eventual decrease in the total population, but for the time being, 
the strong influence of the baby-boom generation, which is now in its 
productive years (both economically and demographically), prevents any 
immediate decrease and thus masks the lower fecundity rate. 
It is also interesting to note that from the perspective of 
population density, these four hypotheses are certainly all within the 
realm of what is realistic: 45 inhabitants per square kilometer in the 
first, 73.7, 108.5, and 183 in the others. All these densities are well 
above present-day concentrations for the United states and the U.S.S.R., 
but well below those of West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 26 
Le Bras and Tapinos also considered the population totals in the 
event of a fluctuating rate of fecundity. We, recalJ. that in' all four 
hypotheses of fluctuation, the extreme levels were 1.4 and 2.6 children 
per woman, and the oscillations took place over periods of 25, 33, 50, 
and 100 years, starting in the year 2000. As we see in Table IV, the 
results of all four assumptions are very similar. It may be somewhat 
surprising that the overall movement is, nevertheless, one of signifi-
cant decrease, given that the average fecundity rate would be 
(1.4 + 2.6)/2 = 2 ; 
but it is necessary to calculate the children after two generations--
only 1.4 x 2.5 = 3.4 instead of 4--in order to see the importance of 
the population structure in the total population, Thus, although 
the total population would remain fairly stable in the case of a 
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TABLE IV: Evolution of the French Population under Fluctuating Fecundity 
Hypotheses 
Total 
Population 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2025 2050 2075 
H1* 52.74 53.33 53.66 53.71 53.52 53.11 48.64 44.15 44.14 
H2* 52.74 53.33 53.66 53.71 53.52 53.11 51.61 46.00 43.38 
H3* 52.74 53.33 53.66 53.71 53.52 53.11 52.40 47.58 43.23 
H4* 52.74 53.33 53.66 53.71 53.52 53.11 51.45 47.41 45.74 
fluctuating fecundity, the balance between the age groups would be 
very unstable. The worse case would be that of rapid oscillation, where 
the society would not even have time to adjust to differing needs for 
child care and education, as well as retirement and medical needs. 
We have thus examined briefly the possibilities for the evolution 
of the French population. It seems likely that the actual values would 
lie within the ranges outlined by the various hypotheses above. The 
partition~lg by age of the population, which is important for our 
purposes, will be discussed later when we look more closely at the 
relationship between demographic movements and intergenerational 
transfers. 
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The Financial Evolution of the French Social Security System since 1968 
Since the reforms instituted by the legislation of 1967, the French 
social security system has been marked, in general, by financial instabi-
lity, but this instability has been applied unevenly among the various 
regimes and among the three major branches within the regimes. Discus-
sions of the overall security of the system have naturally centered on 
.I ~ , 27 the regime general. Chadelat's analysis is the most extensive. He 
chooses to call the period of 1968-1975 the initial phase of the recent 
evolution. These years, which included the recession of 1973-1974, were 
marked by serious shortfalls in the Medical Fund, significant surpluses 
in the Family Fund, and near-stability in the Old-age Fund. He explains 
this combination of surpluses and deficits as follows: 
(1) Old-age Fund. The tendency was for a deficit, which was 
compensated by a series of transfers and increased contributions. 
The cause for this tendency toward a shortfall was twofold. 
First, there was a very mild widening of the spread between the 
average benefit and the average salary. Second, the number of 
beneficiaries increased by 5 to 6%, while the active contri-
butors increased only by 1.5%. This led to a structural 
deficit of nearly 5% which required the contributions and 
fund transfers. 
(2) Family Fund. Here the problem lay in the opposite direction. 
The benefits were revalued in line with inflation, which was 
outpaced by the growth in total salarie~, such as to createca 
2 to 3% surplus. In addition, the falling birth rate marked 
by the lowered acceptance of a third child contributed to 
a decrease of eligibles reaching 3%. The spread was thus 
close to 6%. 
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(3) Medical Fund. We are faced here with a much more difficult 
problem. At most, it can be observed that expenses were 
situated approximately 7 to 8% above salaries, this being as 
~lch the result of rising medical costs as of a general 
increase in the volume of claims which is always extremely 
difficult to forecast. 
During this period two transfers were effected, moving surplus from 
the Family Fund to the Medical and Old-age Funds. Legislative, revenue-
raising measures were also taken to help return the funds to a state 
of stability. The balances by year for the 3 branches of the general 
" h th dual d t" t" 28 reg:une s ow e gra e erlora lon : 
1970=+2025 
1973=+834 
1971=+2025 
1974=-3324 
1972=+1138 
1975=-4569 
If we look at the cumulative fund (which increases or decreases from 
year to year depending on whether there is a surplus or a deficit 
for the year in question), the cumulative deficit in the Medical Fund 
was close to 13 billion francs in 1975, while the cumulative surpluses 
in the Family Fund stood at 14 billion francs and in the Old-age Fund 
at 1.5 billion. The total surplus, therefore, was on the order of 2.5 
billion, a figure which, in comparison to the total yearly contributions 
of 170 billion, scarcely represents 4 days of expenses. 
The outlook at the beginning of 1976 was rather gloomy, especially 
in light of ever-increasing medical costs. Various reforms were 
attempted by the government in an effort to increase revenues and 
control eX,J)endi tures, but it was finally a more rapid increase in 
salaries and a strong slowdown in the rate of rising medical costs 
(as difficult to explain as the fast increases of 1975), that permitted 
an actual surplus of 5 billion in 1977. Public opinion became less and 
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less concerned with the financial problems of social security, and 
people were even heard to comment, "We have lost the social security 
deficit." 
This only marked, however, the end of another phase in the evolution 
of French social security. Beginning in 1978 there was a reacceleration 
of medical inflation, and outlays were further increased by numerous 
improvements in old-age insurance. The result was a huge deficit of 
10.8 billion francs and a further increase in contributions effective 
January 1, 1979. 29 
More recently, changes in the contribution structure for the Family 
Fund in 1981 had the effect of throwing that branch of the general regime 
into defid.t, while the deteriorating economic conditions of the country 
due to the recession contributed to unemployment and thus reduced 
contributions across the board. The forecasts during the year were for 
a deficit of 10 billion, but, thanks to various legislative measures, 
the final talance for the general regime was limited to 6.6 billion 
francs in the red. Increased contributions and general wage and price 
controls in 1982 were expected to help the system return slowly to 
financial health in the period 1982-1983, although we have only estimates 
from late 1982 at our disposal. These show, nontheless, the desired 
improvements. 30 
What is important to pull from this complicated evolution is the 
multiplicity of factors which affect the year-to-year financial situation 
of the system. There are, of course, certain demographic factors to be 
analysed, such as the increasing proportion of aged persons with its 
concomitant effects on the Old-age Fund and Medical Fund. It would be 
naive, however, to ignore the large role played by ever-increasing 
medical costs, economic fluctuations such as unemployment, and political 
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changes affecting both contributions and benefits. Since it is, 
nevertheless, the stated purpose of this paper to examine the relation-
ship between French demographic evolution and the social security 
system, we shall discuss the financial evolution of the three branches in 
light of the demographic movements being realized today or expected in 
the future. 
In tho medical branch, the analysis is difficult due both to 
competing factors, whose effects are at least as great as the demographic 
ones, and to a serious lack of adequate statistical data on the subject, 
as Chesnais has remarked. 31 The three groups with the highest medical 
consumption are (1) infants, (2) the aged, and (3) maternity-age 
mothers, although to a lesser extent. These three groups account for 
41% of all hospital stays, although they represent only 22.5% of the 
population. 32 
The cc~e of the aged is particularly important given the present 
aging of the French population. The population over the age of 60 
represented, in 1970, less than one-fifth of the population; it accounted, 
nevertheless, for almost one-third of all out-of-hospital expenditures, 
of which were one-fourth of all visits to physicians and a little more 
than one-third of all pharmaceutical expenses. In addition, medical 
expenses aI~ increasing more rapidly for those over 60 than for those 
under ~o. From 1960 to 1970, costs for the former increased by 12.8%, 
while for the latter, by a more managable 7.7%.33 
It would then seem that the increasing numbers of aged persons in 
France would portend increasing burdens on the social security system, 
but various French observers of the situation have remarked that, in the 
final analysis, demographic movements are overshadowed by the other 
factors involved. To quote one team of such observers : "Despite the 
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very strong influence of age on the level of medical consumption, the 
deformatio::l of the age pyramid observed or foreseeable in France has 
not been and will not be, all other things being equal, a perceptible 
factor in the growth of average medical consumption." It is also noted 
that, from 1950 to 1970, growth in medical expenses due to such a 
deformation would have been less than 5% for all types of care, whereas 
the true growth was close to 300%. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
changes in the age pyramid are slow, often too slow even to be 
perceptible. 34 
If demography thus becomes but a subsidiary instrument in the area 
of medical cost forecasting, it is still an indispensable tool in 
planning for retirement systems. As we have observed, in a pay-as-you-go 
pension system, the equilibrium of the system is based upon the relation-
ship between two populations, that of the contributors and that of the 
beneficiaries. More precisely, it depends on the three following 
factors: 
(1 ) the number, sex, and age of the active contributors; 
(2) the average retirement age; 
and (3) the number, sex, age, and life expectancy at retirement of 
the beneficiaries and their survivors. 35 
Lowering mortality has contributed to the aging of the population, 
especially the female population, and thus to an increasing mass of 
outlays for old-age pensions. Its influence is nevertheless not as 
important in the long term as the evolution of the fecundity rate. 
In fact, if we isolate the effects of catastrophies, such as wars, the 
numerical relationships between the various age groups are essentially 
the result of this evolution. An important ratiQ, which is strongly 
tied to changes in fertility, is the ratio of retirees to actives. 
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This may bEl called the "demographic pension burden." Taking an average 
retirement age of 63, we can see the development or projection of this 
ratio at H)-year intervals since 195536 : 
1955: 0.29 
1965: 0.33 
1975: 0.35 
1985: 0.31 
The ml.ld regression for the year 1985 is explained by the presence 
among the I~tired age group of the numerically depressed cohort born 
in World Wax I. starting in the late 1980's and 1990's, however, a 
similarly o.eficient group born after the late 1960's, and especially 
after 1973, will reach active age; and this will result in an active 
population which ceases to increase, risking even a slight decrease, 
while the :prodigious generation of the 1920's will reach full retire-
ment age. Except in the case of a significant increase in worker 
productivit.y or an increase in feminine activity (which adds workers 
without greatly increasing benefits), the cost for the active population 
of such a pay-as-you-go system risks becoming increasingly intolerable. 
This effect. could be made even more significant by a reduction in the 
average retirement age (which is expected). 
Demography also plays a significant role in the area of family 
benefits in France. As we have noted, French demography is marked by 
a decreasing birth rate, and thus it should not surprise us that the 
Family Benefits Fund was traditionally in a state of surplus during the 
1970's. Since benefits are awarded only for children of second or 
greater order in a family, though, we need to examine the evolution of 
the distribution of present births among the orders. We can see in 
Table V the increasing proportion of births which represent the first 
--
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TABLE V: Comparative Distribution of Legitimate Live 
1964 and 1974 (per 1000 births) 
Births in 
Order: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ Total 
1964 347 265 160 90 53 32 20 13 8 12 1000 
1974 469 301 121 51 24 14 8 5 3 4 1000 
"Fluctuations demographiques ./ Source: Chesnais, Jean-Claude. et Depenses 
de Securi tE; sociale." Population, no. 2, 1977. 
or second c:hild wi thin a family as well as the decreasing proportion of 
births of the third or higher order. In addition, we note that the 
proportion of births of orders greater than 3 has been reduced by more 
than half (passing from 23% in 1964 to 11% in 1974). 
It is important to realize, however, that this does not indicate 
that there are large numbers of people who remain without children. 
In fact, France is unique in its near-total absence of families without 
children. 3? 
With this decreasing percentage of children among the higher orders, 
family benefits per qualifying family have been decreasing as well. All 
benefits are calculated by reference to a base figure (632 francs per 
month, for example, in 1975). No benefits are paid for the first 
child, while 22% of the base figure is awarded for the second child. 
This benefit increases by 37% (of the base figure) for the third and 
fourth child, then by 33% for each additional child. Average benefits 
paid out fer 100 families according to this system were thus 44.14 times 
the base figure in 1964, as opposed to 40.80 in 1973. Chesnais predicted 
in 1977 that this figure would be further reduced to 31.60 in 1985. 
Table VI shows the method of calculation for these figures. 
The present aging of the French population is thus exercising a 
positive influence on the financing of social security in the area of 
--
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TABLE VI: Influence of Changing Family structure on Benefits Paid Out 
Benefit Distribution of Total Benefits Paid Out 
Number as Beneficiary Families As % of Base Figure 
of Percent of (per 100 families) (per 100 families) 
Children Base 
F'igure* 1964 1973 1985 1964 1973 1985 
1 a 24.3 21.9 25 0 0 0 
2 22 36.4 42.1 50 8.01 9.26 11 •. 00 
3 59 20.2 20.3 15 11.92 11.98 8.85 
4 96 9.9 8.5 6 9.50 8.16 5.76 
5 129 4.7 3.8 2.5 6.06 4.90 3·23 
6 162 2.4 1.8 1 3.89 2.92 1.62 
7 195 1.1 0.9 0.5 2.15 1.76 1.14 8+ (261)** 1.0 0.4 2.61 1.83 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 44.14 40.80 31.60 
* 632 francs per month, for example, in 1975. 
**We assume that for the category of 8 children or more the average is 
Source: Chesnais. Population, no. 2, 1977. 
family benefits. As we have seen, the opposite is true as concerns 
old-age and. medical benefits. In all cases the effects could be 
substantial. over the long term, but it would be illusory, according 
to Chesnais, to assume that savings accrued in the Family Fund will be 
sufficient to insure the financial soundness of the other two branches. 38 
There remains one significant factor in the recent financial history 
of the French social security system which deserves mention. This is 
the fiscal imbalance between the various regimes, especially as concerns 
old-age pensions. Since some of the regimes, for example the special 
regimes, consist of the workers and retirees of a particular industry, 
they are subject to the changing demographic characteristics of that 
sector of the economy. There has often resulted a serious imbalance 
in the ratio of retirees to actives, as shown in Table VII. The extreme 
case is that of the miners I regime, where there are 7.1 retiree pensions 
to be paid by each worker. In the general regime, the ratio is a mere 
9. 
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TABLE VII: Ratio of Retirees to Actives in Various Regimes 
Miners 7.1 
Railroad workers 2.1 
Salaried Agricultural 1.9 
Sailors 1.48 
Farmers 1.44 
Merchants 1.41 
utility workers 1.26 
Artisans 1.23 
Government service 0.80 
R~gime g&n~ral 0.35 
Liberal professions 0.27 
Municipal workers 0.24 
Source: Chesnais. Population, no. 2, 1977. 
0.35 pensions per worker. 
The excess costs for the regimes suffering from an unfavorable 
demographic balance cannot always be borne entirely by the active 
contributors of that regime. It is for this reason that transfers 
between the regimes, corning mainly from the regime g~n~ral, have become 
common, along with various state subsidies to regimes in deficit. In 
the end this only points to the problems posed by the fragmented nature 
of the total system, since it adapts so poorly to demographic shifts 
within the economy from one sector to another. 
-
--39-
Intergenerational Transfer and Social Security Financing 
All social security expenditures can be classified as administra-
tive or functional in nature. As we have seen, the former are more 
or less insignificant in the case of France. The latter represent, 
to the contrary, an important means of consumption within the country. 
This consum])tion indicates the commanding political and social 
priorities of the nation. These "functional" expenditures can be 
divided into three groups depending on the nature of the transfer 
effected: 
(1) Acquisition of goods and services. These are mainly medical 
benefits and represent goods purchased collectively much as 
public education is purchased without regard for a strict 
equivalence between what one pays and what one receives; 
(2) Intergenerational transfers. These are both family and .Illld-age 
benefits and consist of a direct transfer from the active 
population to the inactives; 
(3) Reserve payments. These "carry forward" operations would be 
part of a funded old-age pension system and constitute 
collective savings to cover future expenses. 
Our concern in the final section of this paper will be with the 
last two of these three categories. We shall thus be considering only 
family and old-age benefits as provided under social security, even 
though medical benefits can represent an intergenerational transfer 
in the sense that inactive older persons tend to consume more than 
their share. Also, although we shall continue to rely heavily on the 
French example, our discussion will become more and more general, 
exploring the question of intergenerational transfer and social 
securi ty as it could apply to any country. 
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Our task is complicated by the question of which inactives to 
include in the inactive-active dependency ratio. Many authors, 
especially American ones, have emphasized the role of retired persons 
in this group at the exclusion of children (see Keyfitz or Browning). 
This is perhaps natural for the U. S. where there are few family benefits 
offered by social security or government in general, but for France 
we are forced to consider not only the retiree-active ratio, but also 
the more complete inactive-active ratio (which counts both youths and 
the aged among the inactives). 
Along the same line of reasoning, it may be necessary for complete-
ness to weigh the costs of state education alongside social security 
costs when considering the total burden of intergenerational transfers. 
In any final analysis, it is not the intent of this paper to answer 
which of these ratios is the more valid measure. Some may argue that 
children are helpless and must be cared for by the active population 
as a group, Nhile retirees have had the opportunity to provide for 
their own retirement and should thus be responsible for themselVes. 
Others may feel that all inactives should be considered in one group 
and cared for as a whole. Better, more comprehensive arguments are 
surely possible, but in any case, our ~rpose is to examine both methods 
of measuring dependency. 
In the simplest terms possible, the burden of the intergenerational 
transfer can be expressed as a percentage of the average salary. We note 
that total contributions and total benefits can be expressed as follows: 
contributions = percent of salary x average earnings x active population 
benefits = average benefit x inactive population 
Since contributions must equal benefits (in the absence of inter-fund 
transfers or government subsidies), we may equate these two equations 
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and solve for the percent of salary required: 
h - average benefits inactive population 
- average earnings x active population 
This percentage h is thus the product of two important ratiOS, that of 
average benefits to average earnings (called the earnings replacement 
rate in pension schemes) and that of the inactive to the active popula-
tion. The first is a question of economics and politics; the second, 
of demography. Both ratios are potentially unstable, though it is the 
instability of the latter that interests us in this paper. We must not, 
however, forget the potential importance of the former. 
In the area of old-age pension financing, the inactive-active ratio 
for France can be easily calculated since almost all members of the 
over-65 age group are covered by a pension scheme. As mentioned earlier, 
this will soon probably be a question of the over-60 age group, but the 
majority of our calculations will retain the age of 65. For family 
benefits, however, the task is not so simple in a country like France 
where not all children are covered. Benefits, we have noted, become 
payable for the second and future children. The ratio may thus be 
manipulated as follows: 
all children - first children 
active population 
all children - no. of families with children 
= 
active population 
all children 
= active population x (1 
no. of families with children ) 
all children 
= all children x (1 _ 1 ) 
active population average no. of children in families 
with children 
If the average number of children is thus two, the ratio is one-half 
of the proportion of children within the population. For an average 
family size of three, the ratio is two-thirds times this proportion. 39 
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~ Since a decreasing proportion of young people usually also implies a 
decreasing family size, we can see how this ratio will decrease quickly 
for a country with an aging population such as France. Actual quantita-
tive use of this ratio, however, would require data on the costs of 
raising individual children, including separately educational costs 
which would apply to all children. We shall therefore rely later on 
the comparative costs of children or aged persons as groups of the 
population. 
If we now return to the work of Le Bras and Tapinos concerning 
demographic evolution and its economic implications in France, we see 
in Table VIII that under all four basic hypotheses of fecundity the 
proportion of actives in the population is fairly constant. 
TABLE VIII: Evolution of Actives as Percent of Total Population 
Hypotheses: H1 H2 H3 H4 
1975 42.3 42.3 42.3 42.3 
1980 43.6 43.5 43.5 43.4 
1985 45.0 44.6 44.4 44.0 
1990 46.0 45.2 44.6 43.7 
1995 46.6 45.2 44.2 42.7 
2000 46.9 45.3 43.9 42.0 
2025 44.3 43.4 42.4 40.7 
2050 41.7 42.5 42.6 41.7 
2075 41.7 42.5 42.6 41.7 
The same is true under the hypotheses of a variable fecundity 
rate as we see in Table IX. Any movements within the population 
between the three age groups must then be a question of balance between 
the young and old populations. As can be seen in Tables X and XI, 
these movements would be significant in the extreme cases of fecundity. 
In the year 2075 under a fecundity hypothesis of 1.4, youths represent 
-
only 12.5% of the population while aged persons account for 26.0%. 
If one retains a hypothesis of 2.6, however, the effect is just the 
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TABLE IX: Evolution of Actives as Percent of Total Population in the 
Case of a Fluctuating Fecundity Rate 
Hypotheses: H1* H2* H3* H4* 
1975 42.3 42.3 42.3 42.3 
1geo 43.6 43.6 43.6 43.6 
1965 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 
1990 46.0 46.0 46.0 46.0 
1995 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6 
2000 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 
2025 42.9 40.8 40.7 42.1 
2050 38.8 43.0 40.2 40.4 
2075 42.3 42.1 44.6 40.7 
TABLE X: ~volution of Persons Age 65 and OVer as Percent of Total 
Population 
Hypotheses: H1 H2 H3 H4 
1975 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 
1980 13.6 13.6 13.5 13.5 
1985 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.3 
1990 13.4 13.2 13.0 12.7 
1995 14.2 13.8 13.5 13.0 
2000 14.9 14-3 13.8 13.1 
2025 21.1 18.5 16.5 14.0 
2050 26.0 20.2 16.3 12.1 
2075 26.0 20.2 16.4 12.2 
TABLE XI: Evolution of Persons Age 15 and Under as Percent of Total 
Population 
Hypotheses: H1 H2 H3 H4 
1975 23.7 23.7 23.7 23.7 
1980 22.0 22.1 22.1 22.3 
1985 20.3 20·9 21.3 22.0 
1990 18.6 20.0 21.1 22.7 
1995 17.5 19.9 21.6 24.2 
2000 16.5 19.2 21.5 24.6 
2025 13.2 17.1 20·3 25.1 
2050 12.5 16.7 20.3 25.5 
2075 12.5 16.7 20-3 25.4 
-
opposite: 25.4% youths and 12.2% aged. 
Le Bras and Tapinos continue their analysis by calculating not 
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only the number of children below the age of 15, but also the total 
expected number of people in the educational system. The results, as 
shown in Table XII, indicate the numbers of young children (not yet of 
school age), of school-age children, and of retirees to be supported 
by the average active in the year 2050 (when the system would be stable) 
under each of the four original hypotheses of fecundity. These are, 
in effect, the complete inactive-active ratios in a stable population 
under four different fecundity hypotheses. The important result is 
that if each inactive presents the same average financial burden 
regardless of his age or status, the choice of an ideal fecundity 
hypothesis would be irrelevant as regards the question of intergenera-
tional transfers. 
TABLE XII: Breakdown of the Inactive-Active Ratio in Stable Populations 
Hypotheses: Hl H2 H) H4 
Young Children 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.1) 
School-age Children 0.)2 0.41 0.49 0.61 
Retirees 0.80 0.64 0.5) 0.42 
Total Charge per Active 1.18 1.1) 1.12 1.16 
It would be fallacious to assume, however, that all inactives 
consume equally. What would be needed would be a ratio of the cost 
of an aged person to that of a youth. The difficult task of finding 
40 just such a ratio has been attempted by Lefebvre and Sauvy. In fact 
they have tried to find two such ratios with the goal of considering 
the cost of inactives to the nation or to the state. The latter would 
include only those costs, such as education and social security, 
which are paid by the government or government-controlled organizations. 
The former would consider all means of support, including family or 
charity, and thus total consumption, net any production. 
--
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They estimated that an aged person consumed, in 1980, 1.50 times 
as much as a youth, but that when production is subtracted, this ratio 
becomes 1.23. It would thus appear that an aging population would 
present increasing costs on the active population as a whole, but that 
these increases might not be so significant as to present a serious 
problem. We may develop a modified inactive-active ratio by using the 
1.23 ratio as a weight on the aged population. If we group the young 
children and the school-age children of Table XII into one group, we 
may define the modified inactive-active ratio in this case to be: 
no. of children + 1.23 x no. of retirees 
no. of actives 
= no. of children + 1.23 x no. of retirees 
no. of actives no. of actives 
Using the ~ta from Table XII, we thus have the four modified ratiOS, 
1.36, 1.28, 1.24, and 1.26, for the four respective fecundity hypotheses. 
Since the greatest difference is 0.12, this may be interpreted as saying 
that, when the total charge for the nation is considered, the greatest 
variation likely per active would be 12% of the cost of raising a child, 
over the relevant time period. This could, of course, be compensated for 
by political changes, or the extra cost might be absorbed by economic 
growth so that there is no real excess burden placed on the active 
population. 
If we consider only the costs assumed by the state, however, the 
ratio of consumption by the aged to that of youths becomes more noteworthy. 
By varying methods, the team of Lefebvre and Sauvy arrives at two such 
ratios: 2.19 and 2.78 for 1980. We will thus choose 2.50 as a compro-
mise value. The fact that this ratio is higher than the one above 
indicates the higher proportion of child care accomplished through 
non-governmental means. In the average family this implies that the 
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parents spend more money directly on their children than on the grand-
parents, ruld that these latter rely more heavily than the children 
on governmental support. In a very real sense, then, the aging of the 
French popt~ation is expected to result in increases in government-
controlled intergenerational transfers. 
The modified dependency ratios for the four fecundity hypotheses 
would be 2.38, 2.09, 1.92,- and 1.79. The large difference between the 
first and the last of these implies that taxes and contributions per 
active tagged for intergenerational transfers could vary by as much as 
59% of an average child's state-sponsored consumption. This amounted to 
13,160 francs in 1980, of which 59% would be 7764 francs of increase per 
active. This would seem to be a not insignificant sum. This is, 
however, only for the case of going from best to worst within our 
scheme of four hypotheses and does not represent the possibility for an 
actud increase of this magnitude. Nevertheless, if one compares the 
breakdowns of the stable populations of 2050 to that of today's population, 
it can be seen that today's distribution falls somewhere between that 
of the third or fourth hypotheses. Thus, if the fecundity rate continues 
to decrease or remains at its low, present levels, the possibilities for 
increased state control of intergenerational transfers is imminent. 
This does not indicate, though, that the total of all such transfers 
within the na.tion will significantly increase, as seen above. 
To put the effects of this demographic shift into perspective, 
it would be t~eful to compare the potential of variations in two other 
factors, one political and the other social or economic. These would 
be the legal age of retirement and the rate of female activity in the 
workforce. For the former Le Bras and Tapinos give the active popula-
tion as a percent of the total under the four hypotheses, considering 
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possible cranges in the average retirement age of plus 2 years and minus 
2 or 5 yeax~. The results, as seen in Table XIII, show that variations 
in the age of termination of activity have a potential to alter depen-
dency ratios which is greater than that of simple demographic fluctua-
tions. In addition, these influences are very regular for all four 
fecundity hypotheses. 
TABLE XIII: Actives as Percent of Population Given Variations in 
Legal Retirement Age 
Variations in 
Retirement Age: 
+2 
o 
-2 
-5 
+2 
o 
-2 
-5 
+2 
o 
-2 
-5 
Hypotheses: Hi H2 
In the year 2000: 
48.2 26.5 
46.9 45.2 
45.5 43.9 
43.4 41.9 
In the year 2025: 
46.4 45.2 
44.6 43.5 
42.5 41.8 
39.5 39.1 
In the year 2075: 
43.6 44.2 
41. 7 42.5 
39.7 40.8 
36.8 38.3 
H3 
45.1 
43.9 
42.6 
40.7 
44.0 
42.5 
40.9 
38.5 
44.0 
42.6 
41.1 
38.8 
H4 
43.2 
42.1 
40.8 
39.0 
42.1 
40.8 
39.4 
37.4 
42.9 
41.7 
40.5 
38.6 
Just as we cannot ignore the effects of the retirement age on 
dependency ratios, we must as well weigh the influence of the predicted 
continued increase in the number of active working women. Le Bras and 
Tapinos note that, between 1974 and 1977, the gap between the rates 
of feminine activity and those of the male population closed by close 
to a third. This movement is more marked at the lower working ages 
as might be expected, and this would indicate that the trend may continue. 
Under two scenarios which both show feminine activity rates rising (more 
or less quic}~y) until 2010, when they equal those of males, the active 
population represents a significantly greater proportion of the total 
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TABLE XIV: Actives as Percent of Population Given Increasing Feminine 
Activity 
Hypotheses: H1 H2 H3 H4 
1975 42.7 42.7 42.7 42.7 
1980 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2 
1985 48.5 48.2 48.0 47.6 
1990 51.4 50.6 50.1 49.1 
1995 54.1 52.6 51.5 49.8 
2000 56.2 54.3 52.7 50.5 
2025 57.1 55.6 54.2 51.8 
2050 53.5 54.4 54.2 52.9 
207'5 53.4 54.3 54.2 52.9 
population than predicted earlier. Table XIV shows the results under 
one of these two scenarios (since the results are similar, we choose 
only to display the more conservative hypothesis). 
We thus see the importance of factors other than mortality improve-
ments and fecundity fluctuations on the burden presented by the inactive 
popula ti on. Furthermore, whereas the movement of fecundity rates seems 
elusive, we can be fairly certain of the direction of changes in the 
retirement age and feminine activity. It is almost certain that the 
age of 60 will eventually become the normal retirement age in France, 
and we have good reason to believe that feminine activity in the job 
market will continue to increase. This latter would be all the more 
true in the case of a low fecundity rate (the case which theoretically 
presents the greatest burden on the active population), according to 
studies which have shown an inverse relationship between family size 
and feminine activity. 
If our ,~oncern then is the total intergenerational transfers in a 
country like France, it is seen that the role of demographic movements 
-
will be minil~ in the final analysis when compared to other potential 
changes. If we wish to isolate old-age pensions, however, there is one 
--
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final pers]?ecti ve to be considered. It is necessary to compare the 
two basic aeans of financing a national retirement scheme. The first 
of these is the one present in France or the U.S. and is often called 
the pay-as--you-go system of pension financing. Under this method the 
active generation pays for the pensions received by the retirees of an 
older genelation. No reserve of capital is built up, and the accounts 
must be baJ.anced on a year-to-year basis. This is otherwise known as a 
redistribution system and represents a true intergenerational transfer. 
The second system is only theoretical, as it has only been applied 
in a modified form at a national level. It is, nevertheless, the system 
used in the area of private pension plans and may be called the funded 
system. According to the theory, an individual would contribute to 
social security during his entire active life a certain sum, which would 
be invested by the system and returned to the individual with interest 
in the form of a retirement pension. Each generation would thus be 
entirely responsible for itself in the area of old-age pensions. 
Otherwise ~10wn as a capitalization system, this is an example of the 
"carry-forward" operations of social security mentioned earlier. 
Aside from the relative fairness of the two systems, a comparison 
of the two must also discuss the nature of the intergenerational transfer 
in a pay-as-you-go system, the size of the prospective fund in a capital-
ized system, and the comparative profitability for the insured under 
either system. For the first of these three, it is instructive to 
examine the entire life of a redistribution system and the generations 
which will benefit or suffer the most as a result. For this we draw 
heavily on the work of Browning41 and Picot. 42 
The present French system was developed in a period of high economic 
and demographic growth which favored rapid increases in benefits and 
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~ expectatior~ for what the system could offer. To interrupt today this 
chain of transfers from one generation to the next would hurt most those 
who are now' reaching retirement age and who have contributed all their 
active lives in the hope of receiving, in their turn, an old-age pension. 
Today we are faced with the question of how to divide the charges and 
burdens placed on the old-age pension system by demographic changes 
between the generations. 
It is necessary to be precise about the nature of past growth in 
social security outlays in the area of retirement benefits. This growth, 
when adjusted for inflation, is the result of four factors: the growth 
of the aged population, the extension of pension rights to all social and 
professional categories, the gradual lowering of the retirement age, and 
the growth in the size of the average pension. Table XV illustrates the 
growth in ttle population over age 60, in the number of beneficiaries 
(reflecting both the extension of the system and the decreasing retire-
ment age), and in the average pension. The Table also gives the rate of 
average annual increase in these three areas, as well as the share 
represented by each factor in the growth of total outlays over the 
perl~1~~19~. 
We thus see the importance of benefit size in the growth of the 
total system. The increasing average benefit was due in large measure 
to the maturing of the pension system; there was thus an increasing 
number of retirement-age persons who had contributed for a large portion, 
indeed all, of their active lives. The increase also reflects the 
political cUJ7.rents of the period. There was a move toward favoring the 
aged through guararlteed minimum income legislation, the extension of 
mandatory cODlplementary regimes, and the revaluation of old-age pensions. 
The choice of a pay-as-you-go system of finance reflects the urgency 
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TABLE XV: Factors in Growth of Total Retirement Benefits,_1950-1975 
Year: 
1950 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
Average AmlUal Increase: 
Share of Total Growth: 
Source: Picot, Michel. 
ment de la Population." 
Population 
over 60 
(thousands ) 
676~ 
7604 
8458 
9166 
9672 
1.4% 
16% 
Total 
Beneficiaries 
(thousands ) 
5100 
5600 
6885 
8807 
10267 
1.5% 
18}& 
Annual Pensions 
(average) 
Actual 1978 
francs 
596 
1823 
3252 
4746 
9551 
francs 
3254 
5406 
8007 
9445 
12482 
5.5% 
66% 
"Le Financement des Retraites et Ie Vieillisse-
Vie et Sciences Economiques, October 1980. 
in the construction of the system after the Second World War as well as 
the expectation of sustained economic and demographic growth. A pay-as-
you-go system has the advantage of being Cluickly implemented and, 
as we shall demonstrate later, of being the favored system in a period 
of economic and demographic increase. The problem now is that the 
aging of tt.e population and the slowed economic growth known through the 
1970's and 1980's have reduced the profitability of such a redistribu-
tion system. This creates a contradiction in that the system obligates 
future generations to contribute, even though future generations may 
realize that savings would be more profitable. This will hopefully be 
made clear as we attempt to analyze the profitability of a pay-as-you-go 
system. 
A pay-as-you-go system essentially has two redistributive functions. 
It must first determine how to distribute national income among actives 
and retiree;s, and second how to distribute benefits among pensioners and 
contributions among actives. In France, benefits are determined by the 
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past contributional effort of the retirees, based on three variables: 
(1 ) the level of income submitted to contribution; 
(2) the duration of the period of contribution; 
and (3) the age at retirement. 
By establishing a link between contributional efforts and benefits 
received bjr ~l retirees at anyone time, this creates a certain e~uity 
within anyone generation (we have noted, however, the contradictions 
created by the existence of different regimes with varying benefits). 
Since the contribution rate itself does not enter into the calculation, 
however, this implies that there is no guaranteed link for anyone 
insured bet.ween contributions and futures benefits and creates the 
potential f'or ine~ui ties from one generation to the next. 
To see the relationship among generations we may develop a hypo-
thetical model of a pay-as-you-go system based on the following 
hypotheses: 
(1) the population is divided into three generations, aged 20-40, 
40-60, and 60-80, of which the first two form the active 
population and the last the retirees; 
(2) the contribution rate in the initial three generations is a 
constant 20% of total salary; 
(3) th3 aggregate remuneration begins at 1000 units over the 20 year 
period and grows by 50% each generation (a growth which may 
be either economic or demographic in nature). 
In Table XVI we can see then that in the initial period contributions 
from generations B and C total 400, which is received by generation A 
as a retirement pension. The implicit yield for A is infinite because 
it has made no contributions to the system. In the second period total 
contributions grow by 50%, as do benefits received. The rate of return 
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TABLE XVI: Evolution of a Pay-as-you-go Pension System in Stability 
Period: 1 2 3 
Contribution Rate: 20% 20% 20% 
Grm'lth Rate: 50% 50% 50% 
Generation Salary: C 1000 D 1500 E 2250 
20-40 Contributions: 200 300 450 
Generation Salary: B 1000 C 1500 D 2250 
40-60 Contributions: 200 300 450 
Generation Pension: A 400 B 600 C 900 60-80 
Implicit rate of return: 00 200% 50% 
:fo!, the geEeration B is 200% over the original contribution of 200. 
In the thizu period the system is mature and the generation C receives an 
implicit yield equal to the growth rate of 50% over the intervening 
period. This is seen to be true in the equation, 
900 = 200(1.50)2 + 300(1.50) • 
The rate of return would remain the same now for all consecutive 
generations if contributions and growth remained constant. The generations 
A and B are called the initial generations as they receive benefits 
without having contributed during two full periods. As a result their 
rates of re~um are disproportionately large, and a debt has been 
created whieh will be passed forward from generation to generation as 
long as the system functions. The generatfuon C and those which would 
follow under stable conditions are called the intervening generations. 
At a constarlt rate of contribution, their return is always equal to the 
growth rate. 
Problems may occur when growth slows, whether that be for economic 
or demographic reasons. Table XVII shows the result of zero growth, 
given the two possible political responses. The first response is to 
-, TABLE XVII: Evolution of a Pay-as-you-go Pension System in Instability 
HYIlothesis 1: Constant rate of return of 50% 
Period: 4 5 6 7 
Contribution Rate: 30% 45% 67.5% 0% 
Growth Rate: 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Generation Salary: F 2250 G 2250 2250 I 2250 
20-40 Contributions: 675 1012.5 H 1518.75 0 
Generation Salary: E 2250 F 2250 G 2250 H 2250 40-60 Contributions: 675 1012.5 1518.75 0 
Generation Pension: D 1350 E 2025 F 3037.5 G 0 60-80 
Implicit rate of return: 50% 50% 50% 
Hypothesis 2: Constant contribution rate of 20% 
Period: 4 5 6 7 
Contri.bution Rate 20% 20% 20% 0% 
Growth Rate: 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Generation Salary: F 2250 G 2250 H 2250 I 2250 
20-40 Contributions: 450 450 450 0 
Generation Salary: E 2250 F 2250 G 2250 H 2250 40-60 Contributions: 450 450 450 0 
Generation Pension: D 900 E 900 F 900 G 0 60-80 
Implicit rate of return: 13.7% 0% 0% 
attempt to ~intain the previous implicit rate of return on all pensions 
paid out. This inevitably results in swift increases in the contribu-
tion rate to a point which quickly becomes unbearable. Under the second 
response, the contribution rate is held at a constant 20%, and the 
implicit yield adjusts quickly to match the growth rate. In both cases 
we assume tr~t the system is abandoned in period 7, whether because it 
-, 
has become too much of a burden on the active population, or because it 
is no longer a profitable means of preparing for retirement. 
--
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In both cases it is the generations G and H which suffer a loss 
when the sJ~tem is abandoned, for these two generations have made 
contributions throughout all or part of their active lives and will 
receive nothing in return. If we define the "pension right" as the 
amount of c:ontributions made, multiplied by the growth rate for the 
intel."'Vening periods, we see that the loss in Hypothesis 2 for G is 900 
units, and that of H, 450. This represents the unpaid debt of the 
pay-as-you-·go system and is entirely the result of the pensions paid 
to generations who had not contributed to the system or who otherwise 
received a pension in excess of their pension right, as defined earlier. 
In Hypothesis 2 the calculations are simple. Generation A received 400 
units without having made any contri buti ons • This, multiplied by the 
growth rate for the intervening periods, yields: 
400 x (1.50)2 = 900 • 
For B the pension right was 200 times 1.50, or 300. The pension received 
by B in excess of this pension right was thus 300, which when multiplied 
by the growth rate for the intervening generations, yields 450 units. 
The unpaid debt is thus 450 plus 900, or 1350, which perfectly matches 
the total losses for the terminal generations, G and H. 
For Hypothesis 1 the calculations are somewhat more complicated, 
for we must consider all cases where benefits received exceeded the 
pension right. As above, the debt created by A and B will be 1350 at the 
time the system terminates. Also, we must count the debt created when 
the generations D, E, and F receive pensions in excess of their pension 
rights. For D the pensi on right is 
300 x 1.50 + 450 = 900-, 
so the excess is 450 units. Since E and F do not have the benefit of 
a positive is-rowth rate, their pension rights equal total contributions 
---
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made. The excess of benefits for them is thus 900 and 1350, respectively. 
The total unpaid debt is thus 
1350 + 450 + 900 + 1350 = 4050-, 
which equaJ.s the total loss of the generations G and H: 
1012.5 + 2 x 1518.75 = 4050 • 
We can thus see the dangers in a system where expectations for the 
growth of benefits exceed the demographic and economic growth of the 
country. The inevitable result is that contributions increase as a 
percent of salary to a point which may become unbearable for the actives 
of future e;enerations. The inverse danger is that, if growth is so 
slow as to reduce the profitability of the system, future generations 
may choose to abandon the system in favor of private savings. In either 
case there would be generations which would suffer serious losses at the 
termination of the system. The magnitude of their loss would reflect the 
years of benefits paid out in excess of the beneficiaries' pension rights. 
Picot has estimated that the present accumlated debt for the French 
social security system is around 7 trillion francs43 , a sum which reflects 
not only the potential losses to be suffered by the population of today 
if the system were abandoned, but also the numerous benefits extended 
to people who had not earned them through accumulated contributions. 
These "unearned" benefits, though, are fundamental to the nature 
of a redist:ribution system. Even if benefits for the intervening 
generations always equaled the pension right, there would still be the 
debt created by granting pensions to the initial generations who had 
not contributed to the system. Furthermore, the only alternative to such 
a system is to have a fully capitalized system where a fund is established 
from the beginning of the system, from which all pensions will later be 
paid. In this case benefits would exactly match the pensi on right under 
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a capitalized system, which would be the amount of total contributions 
augmented by interest earnings over the intervening period. 
In the consideration of such a fund there are two Cluestions which 
need to be answered. They concern the size of the reserve fund that 
would be reCluired and the comparative profitability of such a system 
for the participants. The pioneer in this area as concerns French 
social security is Bourgeois-Pichat. 44 Key:fitz and Gbmez de Le6n45 
have developed alternative methods of calculation for demonstrating 
the same basic ideas, and we shall at times rely on their methods for 
the sake oj: simplicity. In addition, slight alterations are made in 
order to maintain a certain consistency wi thin our discussion and to 
illustrate further some of the major themes of this paper. 
We st~ by considering a fully capitalized system with the goal 
of determirdng the contribution level as a percent of salary. We take 
as the unit of calculation one single birth, earning one unit of money 
per year, and assume that the level of the resulting pension will also 
be one unit per year. We let k represent the proportion of the salary 
necessary during the active period to establish a fund which will later 
provide an old-age pension. 
For anew birth, the discounted value of all contributions at 
interest rate r is 
k~~ e-rx p(x) dx , 
where p(x) :ls the probability of survival from birth until age x, and 
A and B are the endpoints of the active life. This sum must be eClual 
to the discounted value of the unit retirement pension: S: e -rx p(x) dx , 
where W is the age limit of life. From these two expressions, we can 
calculate the contribution factor to be paid by an active worker: 
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~WB oJ e -rx p(x) dx 
k = ~~-----------
SA
B 
e-rx p(x) dx 
For a pay-as-you-go system we consider a stable population where 
the rate of natural growth is s. There are thus 
-sx () b e p x 
persons allve between ages x and x+dx at any moment in time, where b 
represents the annual rate of births at that moment. If the contribu-
tion factor is h, the total contributions in this population are 
kb S~ e -sx p(x) dx , 
where A and B again represent the limits of the active life, but this 
time withirl the structure of the corresponding stable population. 
Likewise, total benefits are expressed by 
b~: e-sx p(x) dx , 
which is simply the total number of retirees at any moment. Since the 
functioning of the system requires that total contributtons equal total 
benefits at any time, we can calculate the value of h: 
('WB j e -sx p(x) dx 
h = SAB e-sx p(x) dx 
In comparing the formulae for h and k, we see that h=k whenever the rate 
of natural growth s is equal to the retur.n r on invested capital. We 
shall complicate this observation later by allowing for an increasing 
salary level (with commensurate increases in pensions), but for now the 
calculations are simpler if we retain the somewhat unrealistic assumption 
of a constant salary. 
We wouLd now like to calculate the sum possessed by the capitalized 
fund in the case of a fully funded system. The amount theoretically 
belonging to anyone active contributor would reflect contributions made 
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plus any accumulation for interest or survivorship. Thus the sum 
possessed by an active contributor age x would be 
k ): er(x-u) ~f~~ du = k ;~:) ~: e -ru p(u) du • 
There woulcl be 
-sx () b e p x 
persons age x to x+dx who possess this sum, and thus the total sum for 
all active contributors between ages A and B could be calculated 
as fOllOWS:! = )~ b .-sx p(x) Lk ;~)~: .-ru p(u) dj dx 
= kb)~ .(r-S)Xt): .-ru p(u) du1 dx • 
This may be integrated by parts to yield: 
c'l _ kb '"" (r-s)B r B -rx () dx \ B -sx () ] 
>-' - r:s l e JA e p x - J A e p x dx • 
The arr~ount possessed by anyone retiree age x would be the present 
value, discounting for interest and survivorship, of all future benefits: 
rw e-r(u-x) ~du. jx PTXJ 
Summing over B to W and integrating as before, we have the total sum 
possessed by all present retirees: 
S2 - b [ (r_s)B)W -rx () - -- -e e p x 
r-s B 
If we then remember that 
~: e-rx p(x) dx = k)~ e-rx p(x) dx , 
and that 
~: e -sx p(x) dx = h ~ ~ e -sx p(x) dx , 
we may wri t'e the total sum possessed by the fund: 
S = Sl + S2 = ~ (h-k) rAB e-sx p(x) dx • r-s J 
Since we are interested in this sum as a proportion of the aggregate 
remuneration, we calculate the ratio 
S 
b ~~ e -sx p(x) dx 
h-k 
r-s 
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These are then the basic formulae which can be used under our model 
to compare the profitability of a pay-as-you-go system to a funded one 
and to calculate the size of the fund needed in the latter case in 
comparison to the aggregate remuneration. We see that the contribution 
level under the two systems would be equal if the interest rate were 
equal to the rate of natural increase of the population (both of which, 
we recall, are assumed constant). A population which grows quickly will 
provide for an increasing number of future actives who will share the 
burden of a pay-as-you-go system. If the population grows slowly, 
however, so that the rate of growth is exceeded by the long-term interest 
rate on invested capital, a funded system would be preferable, according 
to our model. 
We shall need to remove one simplification, though, to make our 
model truly' meaningful for the real world. We assumed that the level 
of pensions received would be the same as that of salaries. Two problems 
with this assumption are easily removed. The first would be that we have 
implicitly assumed that all salaries would be equal. This aided in 
simplifying the calculations and presents no real problem if we choose 
to speak instead of the average salary level. The second problem is that 
we have assumed an earnings replacement rate of 100%, which would not 
normally be the case. Fortunately, this is no problem either, for it is 
easy to show that if the earnings replacement rate is some percent p 
of the aver.~ge salary, the new contribution rates would be p multiplied 
by either k or h. 
The third problem is somewhat more subtle, however. It involves 
the growth of the average salary over time. This would be irrelevant 
in the case of a redistribution system, but with capitalization of 
contributions it becomes extremely important, because interest earnings 
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have to keep up with inflation. If we let t be the growth rate of the 
average salary, we may recalculate the contribution coeffecient k to take 
account of this fact. In this case t represents both the inflation of 
the average salary and increases due to producti vi ty gains. For a new 
birth, the discounted value of all contributions would thus become 
\' B -rx () tx (' B _ (r-t )x () k)A e p x e dx = k)A e p x dx. 
This must equal the present value of the eventual retirement pension, 
rW -rx () tx dx _ \'W -(r-t)x () )B e p x e - jB e p x dx, 
so that we have 
~: e-(r-t)x p(x) dx 
k = ~~--------------~~ e-(r-t)x p(x) dx 
Under these more realistic assumptions, then, the contribution levels 
of the two systems would be equal if the rate of natural increase of the 
population equals the interest rate adjusted by the growth rate of the 
average salary, and in the absence of equality, we could choose the more 
favorable system accordingly. When the quantity, r-t, is greater than s, 
we would choose a funded system (given that profitability is our only 
criterion). In the inverse case, where s exceeds r-t, we would prefer 
a pay-as-you-go system. 
Return.ing to the case where contributions under the two systems 
would be eq~.lal, however, we see that we have the equivalence relationship, 
r-t=s, 
which may also be written 
r=s+t. 
We discussed earlier the idea of a pension right under a pay-as-you-go 
system, which implies that a beneficiary would receive a pension equal 
to contributions made plus a growth factor which reflects increases in 
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population size and economic productivity over the intervening period. 
This is eS8entially the quantity, s+t, so that the implicit rate of 
return for anyone participant in such a pay-as-you-go system would be 
equivalent to the interest rate r. The two systems would again prove to 
be indistinguishable, except for the presence of the capitalized fund or 
the debt which is passed from generation to generation. 
In considering the size of this fund in comparison to the aggregate 
remuneration, we shall again have to alter our formula to take account 
of the growth in the average salary. This can be accomplished by a 
simple substitution of r-t for r in the original equation, so that we have 
h-k , 
(r-t)-s 
which represents the size of the required fund as a proportion of total 
salaries paid out in one year. 
We need not concern ourselves with the actual calculations of this 
proportion as it has already been dane by other authors (see Bourgeois-
Pichat or Keyfitz and GOmez de Leon). Table XVIII shows various values 
calculated assuming a level of mortality consistent with a life 
expectancy at birth of 77.5 years. 
Thus, assuming moderate population growth and realistic rates of 
interest when adjusted for inflation, it would appear that the fund would 
possess around 4 to 5 times the amount of money paid out each year in 
salaries. ~rhis could present serious problems, given that the total 
wealth of a developed country is generally assumed also to equal from 
4 to 5 times the aggregate annual remuneration. 46 Bourgeois-Pichat and 
Chaperon have shown how even the annual interest paid to such a fund 
would more than double the percent of national revenue which goes for the 
return on capital investments. 47 The conclusion of these· writers is 
that a fully-funded pension scheme on a national level would be an 
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TABLE XVIII: Values of (h-k)/(r-t-s) assuming eo=77.5 years. 
r-t: s: 0.03369 0.01458 0.008539 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
5.570 
6.315 
7.203 
8.252 
9.501 
10.673 
12.743 
3.463 
4.026 
4.711 
5.588 
6 • .563 
7.769 
9.207 
2.630 
3.156 
3.681 
4.418 
5.301 
6.375 
7.664 
Source: Keyfitz, Nathan and Jose G'Omez de Leon. "Considerations 
demographi<;.ues sur les Systemes de Retraite." Population, no. 4-5. 1980. 
impossi bili ty due to the magnitude of this fund and the inability of 
the capital markets of the country to absorb such massive investments. 
The only alternative then to a pay-as-you-go system would appear 
to be a partially-funded scheme, which would essentially combine a 
redistribution and a funded operation into one overall system. Keyfitz 
suggests that the funded portion might be feasibly able to represent 
one-fifth of the total system. This would in a way resemble the earnings-
related system Sweden adopted in 1959. By 1978 the fund for this scheme 
had accumulated some 131.5 billion kronor (about $30 billion), 'Which 
accounts foz' over one-third of the annual GNP of the country. 48 It is 
also obviously a major source of capital formation, and it is suggested 
that its pUJ~ose is more to provide a source of investment that for its 
pension-funding potential. 49 
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